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Lorenz System Parameter Determination and
Application to Break the Security of Two-channel
Chaotic Cryptosystems
A. B. Orue, G. Alvarez, M. Romera, G. Pastor, F. Montoya and Shujun Li
Abstract— This paper describes how to determine the param-
eter values of the chaotic Lorenz system used in a two-channel
cryptosystem. The geometrical properties of the Lorenz system
are used firstly to reduce the parameter search space, then the
parameters are exactly determined, directly from the ciphertext,
through the minimization of the average jamming noise power
created by the encryption process.
Index Terms— Chaos, cryptography, cryptanalysis, nonlinear
systems, security of data, Lorenz system.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN recent years, a growing number of cryptosystems basedon chaos synchronization have been proposed [1], many
of them fundamentally flawed by a lack of robustness and
security.
The first schemes of synchronization-related chaotic cryp-
tography were based on the masking of a plaintext message by
a system variable of a chaotic generator [2]–[4]. The receiver
had to synchronize with the sender to regenerate the chaotic
signal and thus recover the message. This simple design is
easily broken by elemental filtering of the ciphertext signal
[5]–[7].
Recently, there appeared some chaotic cryptosystems with
an enhanced plaintext concealment mechanism: the ciphertext
consisted of a complicated non-linear combination of the
plaintext and a variable of a chaotic transmitter generator, from
which it was an unattainable goal to retrieve a clean plaintext.
As it was impossible to synchronize a chaotic receiver with
such ciphertext, a second channel was used for synchroniza-
tion. The synchronizing signal was a different sender chaotic
variable, that was transmitted without modification. The same
system parameters values were used at sender and receiver
[8]–[10].
One of these cryptosystems, proposed by Jiang [8], made
use of the Lorenz chaotic system [13], that is defined by the
following equations:
x˙ = σ(y − x),
y˙ = ρx− y − xz, (1)
z˙ = xy − βz,
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where σ, ρ and β are fixed parameters.
The ciphertext s was defined as
s = f1(x, y, z) + f2(x, y, z)m, (2)
where m is the plaintext.
The receiver was designed as a reduced order nonlinear
observer with a mechanism to achieve efficient partial synchro-
nization, under the drive of x(t). It can generate two signals
yr(t) and zr(t) that converge to the driver system variables
y(t) and z(t), respectively, as t→∞.
The recovered plaintext m∗(t) was retrieved with the func-
tion:
m∗ =
s
f2(x, yr, zr)
− f1(x, yr, zr)
f2(x, yr, zr)
. (3)
It was given an example in [8, §III] with the following
functions: f1(x, y, z) = y2 and f2(x, y, z) = 1 + y2; the
following parameter values: σ = 10, ρ = 28 and β = 8/3;
and with the following initial conditions: (x(0), y(0), z(0)) =
(0, 0.01, 0.01) and (yr(0), zr(0)) = (0.05, 0.05). The plain-
text was a small amplitude sinusoidal signal of 30 Hz, m(t) =
0.05 sin(2pi30t). The author claimed that this cryptosystem
guarantees higher security and privacy, showing that an error
of 0.05 in the retrieval of yr, due to a poor parameter
estimation, giving rise to a serious distortion in the retrieved
plaintext.
In the vast majority of chaotic cryptosystems, the security
relies on the secrecy of the system parameters, which play the
role of secret key. Hence, the determination of the system
parameters is equivalent to breaking the system. Recently,
Solak [11] analyzed the cryptosystem [8] and showed how
an eavesdropper could identify the value of the parameter ρ,
provided that it has the previous knowledge of the two other
transmitter system parameters β and σ. Solak’s approach was
based on a novel expression of the Lorenz system. Formerly
Stojanovski, Kocarev and Parlitz [12] described a generic
method, to reveal simultaneously all the three parameters of
a Lorenz system when one of the the variables x(t) or y(t)
were known, that could be applied to break this cryptosystem.
The present work describes an efficient determination
method of the only two unknown parameters ρ and β needed
to build up an intruder Lorenz system receiver, from the
ciphertext alone, without partial knowledge of any transmitter
parameters. Firstly, some geometrical properties of the Lorenz
attractor are shown. Then, advantage is taken of them to
minimize, as much as possible, the parameters search space.
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Fig. 1. Lorenz chaotic attractor; (a) x−y plane projection; (b) enlarged view,
showing the incoming trajectories portion attracted by the equilibrium point
C+, the flow direction is indicated by arrows. The position of the equilibrium
points C+ and C− is indicated by asterisks.
Finally, the unknown receiver parameters are determined with
high accuracy.
II. THE LORENZ ATTRACTOR’S GEOMETRICAL
PROPERTIES
According to [13], the Lorenz system has three equilibrium
points. The origin is an equilibrium point for all parameter
values; for 0 < ρ < 1 the origin is a globally attracting
asymptotically stable sink; for 1 ≤ ρ ≤ ρH the origin
becomes a non-stable saddle point, giving rise to two other
stable twin equilibrium points C+ and C−, of coordinates
xC± = ±
√
β(ρ− 1), yC± = ±
√
β(ρ− 1) and zC± = ρ− 1,
being ρH a critical value, corresponding to a Hopf bifurcation
[14], whose value is:
ρH =
σ(σ + β + 3)
(σ − β − 1) . (4)
When ρ exceeds the critical value ρH the equilibrium
points C+ and C− become non-stable saddle foci, by a Hopf
bifurcation, and the strange Lorenz attractor appears. The
flow, linearized around C+ and C−, has one negative real
eigenvalue and a complex conjugate pair of eigenvalues with
positive real part. As a consequence, the equilibrium points
are linearly attracting and spirally repelling.
Figure 1(a) shows the double scroll Lorenz attractor formed
by the projection on the x − y plane, in the phase space, of
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Fig. 2. Equilibrium points C± estimation relative error, when taking the
eye center coordinate x∗
C±
instead of the true value of x
C±
.
a trajectory portion extending along 12 s; the parameters are
σ = 16, ρ = 100 and β = 8/3.
It is a well known fact that the Lorenz attractor trajectory
draws two 3D loops, in the vicinity of the equilibrium points
C+ and C−, with a spiral like shape of steadily growing
amplitude, jumping from one of them to the other, at ir-
regular intervals, in a random like manner though actually
deterministic [13]. The trajectory may pass arbitrarily near to
the equilibrium points, but never reach them while in chaotic
regime.
The geometrical properties of Lorenz system allows for
a previous reduction of the search space of the ρ and β
parameters, taking advantage of the relation of them with the
coordinates xC± = ±
√
β(ρ− 1) of the equilibrium points.
Let us call attractor eyes to the two neighborhood regions
around the equilibrium points that are not filled with the spiral
trajectory. The eye centres are the fixed points C+ and C−.
The pending problem is to determine the eye centres when
the inner turns are missing, as happens in normal chaotic
regime. With the drive signal x(t), we solved it by exper-
imentally estimating the middle point value of the trajectory
maxima and minima in the phase space projection on the x−y
plane. The best result was obtained by taking into account only
the regular spiral cycle closest to the center, shown in Fig. 1(b)
as a thick continuous line. The x-coordinate of the eye center
was calculated with the following empirical formula:
x∗C± =
0.9 xm1 + 0.1 xm2 + xM1
2
, (5)
where xM1 is the minimum of all the maxima of |x(t)| spiral
trajectory, xm1 and xm2 are the two minima immediately
preceding and following xM1, respectively.
As the spiral has a growing radius, it was necessary to
take a weighted mean between the two minima xm1 and
xm2, the optimal values of the two weights were determined
experimentally. Instead of making two computations, one
around C+ and another around C−, a unique computation
was done on the absolute value waveform |x(t)|. It should
be noted that all the first maxima after a change of sign of
x(t) and y(t) must be discarded because they belong to the
incoming trajectory portion attracted by the equilibrium points
C± and do not belong to the spiral trajectory, one of them is
shown in Fig. 1(b) as a thick dashed line.
The result is illustrated in Fig. 2. It can be seen that the
relative value of the error, taking the eye center coordinate
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Fig. 3. Logarithmic power spectrum of the retrieved plaintext with a wrong
guessing of response system parameters.
x∗
C±
instead of the true value of xC± , is less than 2×10−3. The
system parameters were varied in the margins: σ ∈ (9.7, 37.4),
ρ ∈ (25.6, 94.8) and β ∈ (2.6, 8.4). The system initial
conditions were the same as the example of [8, §III]; the period
of measurement was 20 s and the sampling frequency was
1200 Hz.
In this way, the search space of the unknown parameters β
and ρ is reduced to a narrow margin defined as β∗(ρ∗ − 1) ∈
{0.996 x∗ 2
C±
, 1.004 x∗ 2
C±
}.
Applying this method to the proposed example of [8,
§III], whose equilibrium point is xC± =
√
72, the absolute
determination error of x∗
C±
was 7.5 × 10−4, equivalent to a
relative error of 0.0089% .
III. BREAKING OF THE PROPOSED ENCRYPTION SYSTEM
We designed an intruder receiver based on a homogeneous
driving synchronization mechanism [15] between the trans-
mitter drive Lorenz system and a receiver response subsystem,
that was a partial duplicate of the drive system reduced to only
two variables yr(t) and zr(t), driven by the drive variable x(t).
The response system was defined by the following equations:
y˙r = ρ
∗x− yr − xzr,
z˙r = xyr − β∗zr. (6)
Note that for breaking the system it is only necessary to get
the knowledge of the parameters ρ and β, i.e. the parameter
σ may be ignored and need not be determined, unlike in the
Solak method [11] which requires its previous knowledge, or
in the Stojanovski et all. method [12] which requires the simul-
taneous determination of all the three unknown parameters.
As it was shown in [15, §III], this drive-response config-
uration has two conditional Lyapunov exponents, both fairly
negative, thus leading to a very estable system. The conse-
quence is that, if the parameters of drive and response systems
are moderately different, the drive and response variables will
be alike, though not totally identical. This property may be
exploited to search the right parameter values looking at the
retrieved plaintext and applying an optimization procedure to
find the parameters that provide the best retrieved plaintext
quality.
When the synchronizing signal is fed to the response system
described by Eq. (6) and the parameters of both systems agree,
i.e. ρ∗ = ρ and β∗ = β, the variables y and yr of the drive an
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Fig. 4. Logarithmic representation of the mean of the recovered text noise
power ε2, for several values of x∗
C±
.
response systems are equal, hence the recovered text m∗(t)
follows the plaintext m(t) exactly; being negligible the effect
of different initial conditions after a very short transient. If
the parameters of both systems do not agree, the recovered
text will consist of a noisy distorted version of the original
plaintext, growing the noise and distortion as the mismatch
between drive and response systems parameters grows.
A. Parameter determination
In the particular case of the example in [8, §III], the
encryption and decryption functions were:
s = y2 + (1 + y2)m, (7)
m∗ =
s
1 + y2r
− y
2
r
1 + y2r
. (8)
Equation (8) of the recovered text can be rewritten as:
m∗ = m
1 + y2
1 + y2r
+
y2 − y2r
1 + y2r
. (9)
This equation has two terms, the first one is a function of
the plaintext message m(t) and the variables y and yr. When
y = yr the term is reduced to the undistorted plaintext, but if
y 6= yr a distortion appears. The second term is a function of
y and yr and can be considered as a jamming noise. Figure 3
depicts the spectrum of the recovered text corresponding to the
example, but with a wrong guessing of the response system
parameters: ρ∗ = 28.01 and β∗ = 2.667. It can be seen that
the spectrum has two main frequency bands: one around the
plaintext m(t) frequency of 30 Hz, that corresponds to the
distorted plaintext, and another near 0 Hz that corresponds to
the jamming noise. Assuming that the plaintext will always
consist of an a.c. band limited signal without d.c. component,
as in the numerical example given in [8], it is clear from Fig. 3
that the second term of Eq. (9) may be isolated from the first
by means of a suitable filter.
The most important band of the jamming noise ε was
isolated by means of a finite impulse response low pass
4filter with 2048 terms and a cutoff frequency of 0.2 Hz, that
suppressed the contribution of the plaintext m(t) and most
of the frequency terms generated by the modulation with
the chaotic signal y2(t). Figure 4 illustrates the mean value
of the squared noise ε2, i.e. the average noise power, as a
function of ρ∗, with the eye center x∗
C±
as parameter, with the
same transmitter system parameters of the numerical example
presented in [8] and the intruder receiver described by Eq. (6).
The mean of ε2 was computed along the first 20 s, after a delay
of 2 seconds, to let the initial transient finish. It is clearly seen
that the noise grows monotonically with the mismatch between
the transmitter and receiver parameters |ρ∗ − ρ| and that the
minimum error corresponds to the receiver system parameter
ρ∗ exactly matching the transmitter system parameter ρ, when
x∗
C±
= xC± =
√
β(ρ− 1) = √72.
The search of the correct parameter values β∗ and ρ∗ is
carried out with the following procedure:
1) Determine the approximate value of the eye center x∗
C±
as described in Section II from the x(t) waveform.
2) Keeping the last value of x∗
C±
, vary the value of ρ∗ until
a minimum of the average noise power is reached.
3) Keeping the last value of ρ∗, vary the value of eye center
x∗
C±
until a new minimum of the average noise power
is reached.
4) Repeat the two previous steps until a stable result of
average noise power will be reached and retain the last
values of ρ∗ and x∗
C±
as the ultimate ones.
5) Calculate the value of β∗ as β∗ = (x∗
C±
)2/(ρ∗ − 1).
Table I shows the evolution of the relative eye center error,
the relative ρ∗ parameter error and the average jamming noise
power. It can be seen that the procedure converges rapidly to
the exact values: ρ∗ = ρ = 28 and x∗
C±
= xC± =
√
72.
TABLE I
EVOLUTION OF THE THE RELATIVE EYE CENTER ERROR, THE RELATIVE
ρ∗ PARAMETER ERROR AND THE AVERAGE JAMMING NOISE POWER.
Step Relative eye center error Relative ρ∗ error Average noise
(x∗
C±
− x
C±
)/x
C±
(ρ∗ − ρ)/ρ power ε2
1 8.90× 10−5
2 8.90× 10−5• −3.57× 10−8 5.2× 10−8
3 2.72× 10−8 −3.57× 10−8• 8.9× 10−12
4 2.72× 10−8• 0 6.5× 10−13
5 0 0• 6.1× 10−13
6 0• 0 6.1× 10−13
• = old data held from the previous step
The value of the unknown parameter β∗ was deduced from
Eq. (5) with the estimated values of ρ∗ and x∗
C±
as β∗ =
(x∗
C±
)2
(ρ∗−1) =
8
3 .
Note that this method works as well for the general case
described by Eqs. (2) and (3) that have similar structure to
Eqs. (7) and (8) which describe the special case of the example
in [8, §III], just selected here for experimental demonstration.
B. Plaintext retrieving
As the system parameters are equivalent to the system key,
once the exact values of β∗ and ρ∗ are known, the ciphertext
can be efficiently decoded by the intruder receiver defined
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Fig. 5. Retrieved plaintext with the ultimate values of the response system
parameters.
by Eq. (6). Figure 5 shows the three first seconds of the
retrieved plaintext with the response system receiver described
by Eq. (6), corresponding to the ciphertext example of [8, §III].
It can be seen that the plaintext is perfectly recovered after a
short transient period of less than one second.
IV. SIMULATIONS
All results were based on simulations with MATLAB 7.1,
the Lorenz integration algorithm was a four-fifth order Runge-
Kutta with an absolute error tolerance of 10−9, and a relative
error tolerance of 10−6.
V. CONCLUSIONS
A simple method was proposed to reduce the parameter
search space of the Lorenz system, based on the determination
of the system equilibrium points from the waveform analysis
of one of its variables x(t). Then the method was applied to the
cryptanalysis of the cryptosystem [8], showing that it is rather
weak since it can be broken without knowing its parameter
values. The total lack of security discourages the use of this
algorithm for secure applications.
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